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How do prediction markets achieve high levels of accuracy? We propose that, in some situations,
traders in prediction markets improve upon publicly available information. Specifically, when there is
a known bias in publicly available information, markets provide an incentive for traders to “de-bias”
this information. In such a situation, a prediction market will provide a more accurate forecast than the
public information available to traders. We test our conjecture using real-money prediction markets
for seven local elections in the United States. We find that the prediction market forecasts are
significantly more accurate than those generated using the pre-election polls.
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INTRODUCTION
In a prediction market, traders buy and sell contracts whose value is tied to
an uncertain future event. Originally used for predicting election outcomes
(Forsythe et al., 1992), today, prediction markets are forecasting product sales
(Chen and Plott, 2001), and movie box office returns (Spann and Skiera, 2003).
There are other markets seeking to predict the winners of movie awards
(Pennock et al., 2000) and sporting events (Servan-Schrieber et al., 2004). Their
ability to provide accurate insights into future events has raised a great deal of
interest in the business community (Kambil and Van Heck, 2002; Kiviat, 2004)
as well as in the popular imagination (Suroweicki, 2004). For a recent review of
research on prediction markets, see Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2004).
Businesses are interested in prediction markets due to their perceived
ability to tap into potentially valuable private information held by employees
who can be widely scattered throughout various levels of the firm. Usually, top
decision makers cannot access this vital information due to barriers imposed
by hierarchical reporting systems typical of large, complex organizations.
Through proper market design, suitable incentives and judicious selection of
traders, an organization can use a prediction market to aggregate valuable
private information from market participants (Kambil and van Heck, 2002).
In fact, the ability of prediction markets to tap into private information held by
very few traders was one of the key motivations for the DARPA experiments
into “terrorism futures markets” (Hulse, 2003).
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Prediction markets have a major advantage over other methods for
aggregating information from a wide variety of sources (Plott, 2000). Rational
expectations theory (Lucas, 1972; Grossman, 1981) suggests that “price
summarizes and reveals all the relevant information in possession of all traders”
(Sunder, 1995). That being said, it is surprising how few studies (outside of a lab
setting) determine how well the information held by traders is aggregated into
the prices observed in a prediction market. One exception is a study by Gruca,
Berg and Cipriano (2005) suggesting that market prices accurately reflect both
the consensus of traders’ private forecasts as well as their differences of opinion.
In this paper, we focus on how prediction markets can aggregate and improve
publicly available information to provide superior forecasts of future events.
The central argument of our research is that traders in prediction markets
are able to correct known biases in publicly available information. Motivated
by monetary gains, traders move prices in the proper direction resulting in
more accurate forecasts of future events. We test this hypothesis using
the results of seven prediction markets associated with local elections in the
United States. In this setting, the public information available to traders
consists of pre-election polls of potential voters. Prior research (Gruca, 1994;
Panagakis, 1989) shows that the vote shares for challengers of incumbents
seeking reelection are significantly biased downwards. Traders in prediction
markets “de-bias” the information provided by polls resulting in a more
accurate forecast than is available from public opinion polls.
In Section 1, we highlight some limitations of the current view of how
prediction markets generate superior predictions. Section 2 contains a discussion
of the role of biased public information in prediction markets. We document the
extent of the bias in the publicly available information (i.e. political polls) with
respect to local U.S. elections in Section 3. In Section 4, we examine the ability
of the Iowa Electronic Market, a real money prediction market, to improve
on the publicly available polling data. We close with a discussion of the results
and their implications in Section 5.
1. BIASED 1MARGINAL TRADERS 5 EFFICIENT PRICES?
The documented accuracy of prediction markets presents an interesting
challenge to researchers trying to understand how prediction markets
aggregate information. From research on individual traders in political
prediction markets, there is ample evidence that the average participant is
biased and prone to trading errors. Consider, for example, the traders in the
original 1988 U.S. Presidential election market. Self-identified supporters of
Bush were more likely to believe that their candidate won each debate. These
same traders increased their holdings of Bush contracts after each debate
while supporters of the opponent Dukakis reduced their holdings of Bush
contracts (Forsythe et al., 1999). In a prediction market for the 1992 U.S.
Presidential election, Oliven and Rietz (2004) found that traders often made
mistakes in submitting limit orders or executing market orders. These errors
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included posting prices that allowed other traders to execute transactions
resulting in risk-free profits, i.e. arbitrage opportunities. Nevertheless, both of
these markets predicted the eventual election outcome with a higher degree
of accuracy than the polls. These results suggest that prices in these prediction
markets were efficient in the sense that they accurately reflected the true
outcomes of these two elections.
To explain how a market made up of biased traders can result in efficient
prices, Forsythe et al. (1992) proposed the “marginal trader hypothesis.” They
conjecture that there is a small group of “marginal traders” whose actions are
not dictated by their political preferences. Furthermore, these traders are able
to move the market toward the correct prices. Marginal traders are identified
as those whose limit orders are near the market. Their trading behavior
appears to be free of the biases of the average trader in the market. Oliven and
Rietz (2004) define marginal traders as “market makers” who submit limit
orders which are executed in the market. Other traders, labeled “price takers”,
generally only execute market orders at prices set by the market makers.
Compared to price takers, market makers are significantly less likely to make
pricing mistakes. Forsythe et al. (1999) suggest that the transactions of these
marginal traders enable the markets to function efficiently.
There are two potential problems with the “marginal trader hypothesis.”
The first is the amount of information that a marginal trader would need to be
an effective arbitrageur between the two camps of biased traders, one
supporting each of the opposing candidates. Marginal traders would have to
know the degree of other traders’ biases towards their favored candidate and
the proportion of biased traders in each camp (Forsythe et al., 1992). As noted
by Forsythe et al. (1992: 1157), it is unlikely that marginal traders have such
insight into the nature and numbers of other traders.
The second and, perhaps, more important limitation is the incompleteness
of the concept. Marginal traders seem to be able to take advantage of the
biases of other traders as well capitalize on their pricing mistakes. However,
the “marginal trader hypothesis” is silent on how traders “know” the outcome
of the election before it occurs. This is a crucial shortcoming. Prediction
markets are usually organized as peer-to-peer trading systems wherein all
trades of individual contracts occur between traders. A pricing mistake by one
trader will, if acted upon, enrich another trader. By rectifying pricing errors by
others, marginal traders should earn higher returns, on average. There is no
requirement for such traders to have better information that would result in
accurate prices in the market.
However, it does appear that marginal traders do have insight into the
outcome of the future event. In the cases of political prediction markets,
the marginal traders appear to know the voting results in advance of Election
Day. Consequently, their trading activity moves prices in the market in the
correct direction. The key question is: How do marginal traders come into
possession of such valuable information?
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One possible explanation is that some traders have superior private
information about the election outcome. The mechanism of a real money
prediction market allows traders with superior private information to benefit
monetarily by trading with other, less well informed participants. In fact, the
importance of traders with superior private information to the effective
functioning of prediction markets is a central point in discussions of prediction
markets (e.g., Forsythe et al., 1999; Kambil and van Heck, 2002). While it is
very difficult to refute the claim that marginal traders possess superior
information, we propose a simpler alternative explanation. We suggest that
traders in prediction markets can aggregate and improve upon publicly available
information to generate more accurate forecasts. Specifically, when publicly
available information exhibits a known bias when used to forecast future
outcomes, traders will “de-bias” the public information. The resulting prices
will provide a superior forecast than is available from the public information.
2. THE ROLE OF PRIVATE AND PUBLIC INFORMATION IN
PREDICTIONMARKETS
The value of using prediction markets as an information aggregation
mechanism lies in their expected ability to incorporate both private and public
information into a single summary statistic: price. Clearly, traders in
prediction markets have access to both public and private information.
However, much of the discussion of the value of prediction markets centers
around the private information traders bring to the market. This may be due to
the nature of the seminal experimental research on the functioning of markets
as information aggregation mechanisms.
This research emphasizes the ability of markets to correctly disseminate
private information. In one set of experiments, the focus was the dissemination
of private information from informed to uninformed traders (Plott and Sunder,
1982). In another set of studies, individual traders were provided incomplete
private information (Plott and Sunder, 1988). Across all traders, the aggregate
of the private information revealed the true state of nature. Through trading,
the market participants revealed their own private information and eventually
all traders shared the same information (Plott and Sunder, 1988).
While these studies were critical building blocks to our understanding of
how markets aggregate information, their primary focus was on traders’
private information. However, traders in prediction markets may have access
to publicly available information in addition to their private sources.
By publicly available information, we are referring to information outside of
the market and its participants. Once trading occurs, some private information
is revealed and becomes publicly observable. In this study, we focus on
external information that may be used by traders in a prediction market.
Often, much of the information available to traders consists of publicly
available information. Consider, for example, a trader seeking to predict the
price of a stock in the near future. In addition to past prices, a trader has access
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to analysts’ forecasts of earnings, disclosures of stock transactions by company
officers, etc. For some prediction markets, traders have access to public
information regarding the future outcome that is the focus of the prediction
market. In a prediction market for sports contests, traders may have access to
predictions from experts as well as odds information from Las Vegas sports
bookies. In political prediction markets for U.S. elections, traders usually have
access to pre-election polls. These publicly available sources of information
are the focus of our empirical study.
In some situations, there is a substantial, directional bias in the information
that is publicly available to traders. If traders know of the bias, they can use this
information to their advantage. Since there are monetary rewards for traders
when market prices mirror the actual outcome of a prediction market, it is in
the traders’ best interest to move prices in the direction that corrects the bias.
As a result, the prediction market should be consistently more accurate than the
public information. This leads to our main hypothesis.
Hypothesis: If the public information available to traders has a
substantial bias, the forecasts generated by prediction markets
will be more accurate than those generated by the public
information.
In the next section, we discuss the presence of a substantial bias in pre-
election polls for U.S. state and local elections
3. THE INCUMBENT RULE FOR U.S. STATE AND LOCAL
ELECTIONS
For state and local elections, traders have public information in the form of
pre-election polls that can serve as a forecast of the vote shares candidates will
achieve on Election Day. In the U.S., a typical political poll in a two-candidate
race asks respondents a question of the form, “If the election were held today,
would you vote for candidate A or candidate B or are you undecided?”
The respondents are usually likely voters (Crespi, 1988). The resulting
proportions of respondents that would vote for candidates A or B are often
portrayed as a forecast of the outcome at the ballot box (Kou and Sobel, 2004).
One potential source of bias in this publicly available information is the
presence of undecided voters. On Election Day, all voters cast their ballot for
one of the candidates. In order to use a poll as a forecast, one must decide how
to handle the undecided voters. Most pollsters interviewed by Crespi (1988:
22) allocate the undecided voters proportionally to their current vote share.
While easy to implement, this approach ignores actual voter behavior in U.S.
state and local elections when an incumbent is running for re-election.
Panagakis (1989) examined the results of 155 state and local polls –
primarily from the late 1980’s – all from incumbent re-election campaigns.
He found that the majority of the undecided vote went to the challenger in
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82% of the cases. The phenomenon of undecided voters splitting in favor of
challengers was dubbed, “The Incumbent Rule.” The reasoning behind the
Incumbent Rule is that in re-election situations, the undecided voters are
undecided about the incumbent whose record is well known. Consequently,
many end up voting against the current office holder. There are exceptions for
short-term incumbents which have not built up a sufficient track record or
well-known challengers who held comparable office.
As a forecast of vote shares on Election Day, polls for incumbents and
challengers have very different properties. Panagakis (1989) found that about
50% of the challengers gained more than 10 points over their final poll vote
share. In contrast, the final poll results for incumbents were within 4 points of
the actual vote share in more than 60% of the cases. These results suggest pre-
election polls are more accurate when predicting the incumbent’s vote share
while the vote share of the challenger seems to be consistently understated.
There was a follow-up study by Gruca (1994) that analyzed a separate set of
138 polls from gubernatorial, U.S. senate and U.S. house contests in 1990 and
1992. He found that the majority of the undecided vote went to the challenger in
67% of the cases. Like the earlier results, 62% of the challengers gained 10 or
more points between the last poll and Election Day. Also, a majority of the poll
projections for the incumbents were within^4 points of the actual vote share.
For this present study, we augmented the Gruca (1994) data set with an
additional set of 43 polls for a total of 181 observations from 1990 and 1992.
Only final media-sponsored polls were included in the sample. For each poll in
this sample, the forecasting error was computed as the difference between the
vote share on Election day and the vote share of the candidate in the final poll.
If the forecasting error is positive, it implies that the candidate received a higher
proportion of votes on Election Day than in the final poll. The cumulative
distribution of the forecasting errors is presented separately for incumbents and
challengers in Figure 1.
This analysis of the polls from these two years (1990 and 1992) for state and
local elections shows that for 84% of the observations, the challenger gained
four or more points between the final poll and Election Day. For incumbents, the
actual vote share for incumbents was within 4 points of the final poll vote share
in 48% of the cases. Both of these results are consistent with Panagakis’ (1989)
results.
The distribution of forecasting errors suggests that the publicly available
information from pre-election polls regarding the vote shares of challengers is
substantially biased downwards. Therefore, we would expect that the forecasts
for challengers from prediction markets in U.S. local and state elections would
be more accurate than the publicly available information from polls. At the
same time, the publicly available information regarding the vote shares of
incumbent candidates has comparatively little bias in either direction.
Therefore, we expect that forecasts from prediction markets will probably be
no more accurate than the forecasts from polls.
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4. EMPIRICAL STUDY
We tested these conjectures using the results of seven prediction markets
conducted by the Iowa Electronic Market (IEM) in 1994. The IEM is a small
scale, real money futures market operated by business school faculty at the
University of Iowa since 1988. In contrast to the original Iowa Political Stock
Market in 1988 which was limited to academic traders within the state of
Iowa, trading in the 1994 election markets was open to traders world-wide.
Prediction market description
In these markets, traders bought and sold contracts whose payoff was
determined by the share of the popular vote in a given election for a particular
candidate. The payoff structure for these contracts was linear, i.e. $1 times the
share attained by the respective candidate. The total payoff across all contracts
sums to $1. For example, in the market for the 1994 Pennsylvania Senate race,
there were three contracts. One contract was associated with incumbent
Senator Wofford, one with the challenger Rick Santorum and one contract
was designated for the rest of the field (all other candidates). Each contract had
a payoff value equal to $1 times the candidate’s share of the popular vote in
the November 1994 election.
Participants in IEM prediction markets act as both buyers and sellers.
The exchange of contracts occurs via a computerized, anonymous double
auction. To buy a contract, a trader can execute a market order and buy at the
current best price available (lowest ask from another trader) in the market.
Alternatively, the trader can submit a limit order. This would include an offer to
buy (bid) at a higher price and a time limit on the offer. [The corresponding
process may be used to sell or offer to sell a contract.] The limit orders (bids/asks)
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FIGURE 1. U.S. elections for governor, U.S. house, U.S. senate (1990 & 1992).
PUBLIC INFORMATION BIAS AND PREDICTION MARKET ACCURACY
225
are queued by price and submission times. Traders can view the best prices in
each queue. Prices in these markets are solely the result of trading activity
between individual traders who remain anonymous to each other.
Traders may acquire contracts from the market in a bundle consisting of
one of each of the contracts in the market. Traders can purchase bundles from
or sell bundles to the IEM exchange at any time for the guaranteed liquidation
value of $1. Selling bundles allows the supply of contracts to vary without
contaminating the individual contract prices.
At the end of the market, contracts are liquidated based on the official
election returns. For a contract associated with a given candidate, there is an
exchange of $1 * popular vote share for that candidate. All money invested in
the market is returned to traders and there are no transaction fees. Individual
trading accounts are limited to $500.
Results
Our study consists of seven different prediction markets. Some details of
the contests are listed in Table 1.1
To determine the accuracy of these prediction markets, we used the last
trade prices in the market on the night before the election (Berg et al., 2007;
Forsythe et al., 1992). As in prior research on political prediction markets, we
normalized these prices to sum to one.
For each political contest, we obtained the final pre-election polling data
for each media organization that sponsored a unique poll. We computed the
mean absolute deviation for each incumbent and challenger using the
prediction market vote shares and the data from the final polls. The results for
incumbents are presented in Figure 2.
The average MAD for the seven incumbents was 2.52 for the IEM
forecasts and 4.25 for the final polls. This difference is not statistically
significant (paired comparison t ¼ 21.24, p,0.23 for a two-tailed test). This
should be expected since there is comparatively little bias in the polling
information about the vote shares of incumbents.
TABLE 1
Political Contests Associated with 1994 IEM Prediction Markets
Year State Office Incumbent
Vote Share on
Election Day Challenger(s)
Vote Share on
Election Day
1994 New Jersey Senator Lautenberg 0.50 Haytaian 0.47
1994 New York Governor Cuomo 0.45 Pataki 0.49
1994 Pennsylvania Senate Wofford 0.47 Santorum 0.49
1994 Texas Governor Richards 0.46 Bush 0.53
1994 Texas Senate Hutchison 0.61 Fisher 0.38
1994 Utah 2nd CD Shepard 0.36 Wadoltz 0.46
Cook 0.18
1994 Virginia Senate Robb 0.46 North 0.43
Coleman 0.11
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The results for challengers are presented in Figure 3.
For challengers, the results are clear. The prediction markets provided a
more accurate forecast of vote share for all 9 challengers (two contests had
multiple challengers). The MAD for the IEM forecasts was 2.7 compared to
7.6 for the final polls. This difference is significant (paired comparison
t ¼ 25.07, p , 0.001 for a two-tailed test). These results suggest traders
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were able to use the substantial downward bias in the publicly available
information on the vote shares of challengers (i.e. pre-election polls) to drive
prices in the prediction market in the correct direction. Therefore, we find
strong support for our study hypothesis.
Comparisons with Proportional Allocation of Undecided Voters
To better understand how traders in these prediction markets improved
upon the publicly available information, we generated an alternative set of
election predictions from the polling data for our seven races. Researchers in
forecasting (e.g Clemen, 1989) suggest that combining multiple forecasts
should result in more accurate results than relying on a single forecast. As noted
above, the typical method to generate vote forecasts from polling data is to
allocate the undecided vote proportionately among the major candidates.
In addition to its use by polling firms, this method of allocating undecided voters
is employed in prior research on a prediction market for 1988 U.S. Presidential
election (Forsythe et al., 1992) and more recent research on using combinations
of forecasts to predict the 2004 U.S. Presidential election (Cruzan et al., 2005).
We applied this normalization to all of the polls for each contest. We then
computed an average vote share for the incumbent and challenger(s).
A comparison of the absolute deviations from the normalized poll results and
the IEM forecasts is presented in Figures 4 and 5.
Using the normalized poll results improved the forecasts for seven of the nine
challengers. At the same time, the normalized poll results provide worse forecasts
than the raw polls for four of the seven incumbents. Overall, the IEM prediction
markets provided a more accurate forecast than the normalized poll results for
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FIGURE 4. Comparison of forecast errors (normalized polling data).
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five of the seven incumbents and eight of the nine challengers. To ascertain the
overall effect of using the normalized poll results as forecasts, we computed the
MAD by contest across the seven markets. The MAD for the forecasts using a
proportionate split of the undecided voters (by contest) is 4.2 compared to 2.5 for
the IEM prediction markets. This difference is statistically significant
(t ¼ 23.19, p , 0.02 for a two-tailed paired comparison t-test). These results
suggest traders do more thanmerely mechanically transform (e.g. a proportionate
allocation of undecided voters) the publicly available data and embed that
information into prices in the market. By understanding and correcting the bias in
pre-election polls for local elections in the U.S. (“the IncumbentRule”), traders in
these markets improve the publicly available information.
5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
The research reported here makes important contributions to our
understanding of prediction markets. First, we provide a testable conjecture –
public information bias – that determines when prediction markets will provide
more accurate forecasts than the public information available to traders.
We confirm that the presence of the bias in the public information available to
traders influences the relative accuracy of prediction market forecasts.
Second, our study of bias in the prediction of vote shares for challengers in
local and state elections in the U.S. provides an interesting alternative
explanation for the relatively poor performance of political prediction markets
outside the United States. In a review of 25 such prediction markets,
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Bruggelambert (1999) finds, in many cases, the forecasts generated by
prediction markets were not more accurate than those available from pre-
election polls. While researchers have examined such explanations as the type
of market, number of traders, number of low share candidates (or political
parties), etc., we offer a testable alternative based on the biases present in the
publicly available pre-election polling data.
In the U.S., it is very rare that a media polling organization reports an
allocation of undecided voters. Consequently, the known bias in state and
local election polls allows prediction market traders to move contract prices
for challengers in the correct direction. It is not known if a similar bias exists
in polling data outside of the United States. In addition, the methodologies
used in other countries with respect to undecided voters may be very different
than those in the U.S., resulting in more accurate predictions by polling
organizations. A useful area for future research would be to test for the
presence of biases in polling data in other countries.
One of the limitations to this study is that public information bias does not
explain why prediction markets succeed (or fail) in every circumstance. For
example, there is considerable disagreement whether the “Incumbent Rule”
applies in Presidential elections.2 In addition, there has been little research on
the disposition of undecided voters in elections that do not feature an
incumbent. Unfortunately, a comparable test of our hypothesis using data
from IEM forecasts of Presidential markets is quite a way away. While the
IEM has been used to predict the popular vote shares in U.S. presidential
elections since 1988, there are only 5 sets of observations. Of these, only 3
featured an incumbent facing re-election. The next opportunity to collect such
data may come in 2012.
More and more organizations are becoming interested in using prediction
markets to aggregate information from public and private sources. This rising
interest comes with a challenge for researchers. In order to determine whether
a prediction market would be effective in a given situation, decision makers
need a comprehensive and predictive theory elucidating the conditions under
which prediction markets will perform better than the second best options
whether these are public polls, Delphi forecasts from experts, econometric
models, etc. Without such a framework, businesses may be hesitant to
undertake the experimental applications of prediction markets that will
expand beyond their current focus on elections, movies and sporting events.
We hope that this study on the influence of public information bias is a first
step on this important path to a general theory of prediction market efficiency.
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NOTES
1. The IEM also organized a prediction market for the 1994 Arizona Senate contest. However, this contest
did not include an incumbent candidate.
2. For a recent comparison between forecasts generated by polls and prediction markets for U.S.
presidential contests, see Erikson and Wlezien (2007).
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